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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
In docket number 38854, Mr. Warth timely appeals from the district court's order
relinquishing jurisdiction, requiring him to serve the previously imposed sentence of four
years, with eighteen months fixed, which he received for his guilty plea to possession of
methamphetamine with intent to deliver. In docket number 38984, Mr. Warth a timely
appeals from the district court's order relinquishing jurisdiction, requiring him to serve
the previously imposed sentences of five years, with two years fixed, and of six years,
with thirty months fixed, which he received for his guilty pleas to two counts of delivery
of a controlled substance.
On appeal, Mr. Warth argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due
process of law when it refused to augment the record with a transcript of a combined
probation violation admission and disposition hearing. Additionally, Mr. Warth argues
that the district court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction and executed
excessively harsh sentences.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In docket number 38854, Mr. Warth was charged, by information, with trafficking
in methamphetamine. (R. Vol. I, pp.33-34.) In docket number 38984, Mr. Warth was
charged, by information, with two counts of delivery of a controlled substance. (R. Vol.
11., pp.178-179.) 1 Pursuant to a global plea agreement, the State amended the charge
in docket number 38854 to possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver to
which Mr. Warth pleaded guilty.

(R. Vol. I, pp.52-60.)

1

As part of that agreement,

Mr. Warth also pleaded guilty to both counts of delivery of a controlled substance.
(R. Vol. II., pp.197-200.) In docket number 38854, the district court imposed a unified
sentence of four years, with eighteen months fixed, but suspended the sentence and
placed Mr. Warth on probation. (R. Vol. I., pp.70-75.) In docket number 38984, the
district court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, for Count I,
and a unified sentence of six years, with thirty months fixed, for Count 11, but suspended
the sentence and placed Mr. Warth on probation. (R. Vol. II., pp.218-222; 05/14/07
Tr., p.47, Ls.9-24.)

Additionally, the district court ordered the sentences in docket

number 38854 and 38984 to run concurrently. (R. Vol. I., p.71; R., Vol. II., p.219.)
After a period of probation, the State filed a report of probation violation in docket
number 38854, wherein it alleged that Mr. Warth violated various terms of his probation.
(R. Vol. I., pp.86-87.)

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the State withdrew its report of

probation violation. (R., p.89.)
After a further period of probation, the State filed a report of probation violation in
both cases, wherein it alleged that Mr. Warth violated various terms of his probation.
(R. Vol. I., pp.90-91; R. Vol. II., pp.237-238.) Mr. Warth then admitted to violating the

terms of his probation.2 (R. Vol. I., pp.102-104; R. Vol. II., pp.246-248.) Thereafter, the

1

These two cases were never consolidated by the district court. However, they were
treated as such.
2
While the record reflects that Mr. Warth admitted to his probation officer that he left his
assigned district without permission and used alcohol, marijuana, and
methamphetamine, the record on appeal does not reflect the specific admission
Mr. Warth made to the district court. (R. Vol. I., pp.90-97, 102-104; R. Vol. II., pp.237241) Appellate counsel anticipated this type of issue and filed a motion to augment the
record on appeal requesting that a transcript of the June 29, 2009, probation violation
admission and disposition hearing be created for the record on appeal. (Motion To
Augment And Suspend The Briefing Schedule And Statement In Support Thereof
(hereinafter, Motion to Augment), pp.1-5. That motion was denied by the Idaho
Supreme Court. (Order Denying Motion To Augment And Suspend The Briefing
Schedule (hereinafter "Order Denying Motion to Augment"), p.1.)
2

district court entered its Order Continuing Probation, wherein the district court ordered
Mr. Warth to complete the Wood Pilot Project. (R. Vol. I., p.105; R., Vol. II., p.249.)
After another period of probation, the State filed a report of probation violation,
wherein it alleged that Mr. Warth violated various terms of his probation. (R. Vol. I.,
pp.110-112; R. Vol. II., pp.253-255.) Mr. Warth admitted to being terminated from the
Wood Pilot Project and using Synthetic Cannabinoid Spice. (10/12/10 Tr., p.3, L.3 p.6, L.16.) Thereafter, the district court revoked Mr. Warth's probation and executed the
underlying sentence, but retained jurisdiction. (R., Vol. I., pp.119-122; R. Vol. II.,
pp.261-265.)
Following Mr. Warth's "rider," the district court relinquished jurisdiction without a
hearing. 3 (R., Vol. I., p.123; R. Vol.II., p.266.) Mr. Warth timely appealed. (R. Vol. I.,
pp.124-127; R. Vol. II., pp.268-271.)
On appeal, Mr. Warth's appellate counsel filed a motion to augment and suspend
the briefing schedule, wherein appellate counsel requested that the record on appeal be
augmented with various transcripts. (Motion to Augment), pp.1-5.) The State objected
to Mr. Warth's request for the transcripts.

(Objection to "Motion to Augment and to

Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof," (hereinafter,
Objection to Motion to Augment), pp.1-5.) Thereafter, the Idaho Supreme Court entered
its Order Denying Motion to Augment, denying Mr. Warth's request for the transcripts.
(Order Denying Motion to Augment), p.1)

3

According to the district court's Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction, Mr. Warth's rider in
this matter was treated as if it was ordered to run concurrently with a rider which was
ordered in an unrelated case, which was filed in a different county. (R. Vol. I., p.123;
R. Vol. II., p.266.) Since the district court presiding over the unrelated case relinquished
jurisdiction, the district court in this matter relinquished jurisdiction because it thought
that "probation is not an option .... " (R. Vol. I., p.123; R. Vol. II., p.266.)
3

ISSUES
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Warth due process and equal protection
when it denied his Motion to Augment with the requested transcript?
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction?
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed
Mr. Warth's sentences sua sponte upon relinquishing jurisdiction?

4

to

reduce

ARGUMENT
I.
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Warth Due Process And Equal Protection When
It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The Requested Transcript

A.

Introduction
A long line of United States Supreme Court cases hold that it is a violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses to deny an indigent
defendant access to transcripts of proceedings which are relevant to issues the
defendant intends to raise on appeal.

The only way a court can constitutionally

preclude an indigent defendant access to a requested transcript is if the State can prove
that the transcript is irrelevant to the appeal.
In this case, Mr. Warth filed a Motion to Augment, requesting, inter alia, a
transcript of the probation violation admission and disposition hearing, held June 29,
2009, wherein he argued that, when determining whether to relinquish jurisdiction, a
district court can consider all of the hearings before and after sentencing. On appeal,
l\/lr. Warth is challenging the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his request for the
transcript of the probation violation admission and dispositional hearing, held June 29,
2009. Mr. Warth asserts that the requested transcript is relevant to the district court's
decision to relinquish jurisdiction and its sentencing determination because it occurred
after sentencing, and the district court could have, therefore, relied on its memory of that
hearing when it decided to relinquish jurisdiction and execute the underlying sentences.
Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court erred in denying his request.

5

B.

The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Warth Due Process And Equal
Protection When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The
Requested Transcript

1.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Warth With
Access To The Requested Transcript, Has Denied Him Due Process
Because He Cannot Obtain A Merit Based Appellate Review Of His
Claims

The constitutions of both the United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a
criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; ID. CONST. art.
I §13.
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965);
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair."
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24
(1981).
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood,

132 Idaho 88 (1998)). Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United
States Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United
States Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution."

Maresh v. State,

Dept. of Health and Welfare ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221,227 (1998).

In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute. See
I.C. § 19-2801. Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a transcript,
the cost of such transcript must be created at county expense.
I.C. § 19-863(a).

Idaho court rules also address this issue.

I.C. § 1-1105(2);

Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2

mandates the production of transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant.
I.C.R. 5.2(a).

Further, "[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding

before the court .... " Id. Idaho Criminal Rule 54.7 further enables a district court to
6

"order a transcript to be prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from
paying such a fee as provided by statute or law." I.C.R. 54.7(a).
An appeal from an order relinquishing jurisdiction is an appeal of right as defined
in Idaho Appellate Rule 11. "Relief from ... [an order relinquishing jurisdiction] may
appropriately be sought through a direct appeal." State v. Urias 123 Idaho 751, 754 n.1
(Ct. App. 1993).
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of cases that directly
address whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the
relevant proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these cases.
The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection
clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent defendants
and those with financial means is not tolerated. However, the second theme limits the
states' obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for review. The states do
not have to provide indigent defendants with everything they request. In order to meet
the constitutional mandates of due process and equal protection, the states must
provide indigent defendants with an appellate record unless some or all of the
requested materials are unnecessary or frivolous.
The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. 1//inois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a
certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript of the
proceedings, be furnished them without cost." Griffin, 351 at 13. At that time, the State
of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been sentenced to
death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase transcripts
7

themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme Court was
whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty defendants
was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16.
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich,
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of
justice in every American court."' Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227,
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty
than on account of religion, race, or color." Id.

The Supreme Court went on to hold as

follows:
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant.
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious
discriminations.
Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted).

In order to satisfy the constitutional

mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be
provided with a record which facilitates an effective merits-related appellate review. At
the same time, the Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary
in instances where a less expensive, yet adequate, alternative exists. Id. at 20.

8

In Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding
in Griffin when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court
be accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency. In
that case, the State argued that the defendant had already received appellate review of
his conviction by the Ohio appellate court. Bums, 360 U.S. at 257.

The United States

Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled that "once the State chooses to
establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access
to any phase of that procedure because of their poverty." Id. "This principle is no less
applicable where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase
of its appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of
that procedure solely because of his indigency." Id.
In State v. Draper, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a
procedure determining access to transcripts based on a frivolousness standard. "Under
the present standard, ... , they must convince the trial judge that their contentions of
error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary to prosecute their
appeal." Draper, 372 U.S. 494. The Supreme Court first expanded upon its statement
in Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent alternative is
available, by adding a relevancy requirement when stating that "part or all of the
stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the
appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such
circumstances." Id. at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised for
appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts. The
Court ultimately concluded that the issues raised by the defendants could not be

9

adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial
proceedings. Id. at 497-99.
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971 ), extended the Griffin protections

to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to
prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on
appeal. In doing so, it was held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument
that he/she needs items to create a complete record on appeal.

Id. at 195. If the State

wants to deny the defendant's request, it is the State's burden to prove that the
requested items are not necessary for the appeal. Id.
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the
Idaho Court of Appeals.

See Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v.

Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App.

2007).
An application of the foregoing rules to the facts of this case creates a situation
analogous to Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1863).

In that case, a transcript was

necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be dismissed without the
transcript. Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81. Similarly in Idaho, an appellant must provide an
adequate record or the appeal can be dismissed.

"It is well established that an

appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate
court can review the merits of the claims of error, ... and where pertinent portions of
the record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial
court." State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999). If the transcripts are missing,
but the record contains court minutes, that may be sufficient so that a "meaningful
review of [an appellant's] claim is possible, although the Idaho Court of Appeals has
10

"strongly suggest[ed] that appellate counsel not rely on the district court minutes to
provide an adequate record for [that] Court's review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489,
491 (Ct. App. 1999). During one of Mr. Warth's periods of probation, he admitted to his
probation officer that he left his assigned district without permission and used alcohol,
marijuana, and methamphetamine. (R. Vol. I., pp.90-97, R. Vol. II., pp.237-241.) The
court minutes of the probation violation admission and dispositional hearing do not
reflect the specific admissions Mr. Warth made to the district court. (R. Vol. I., pp.102104; R. Vol. II., pp.246-248.) If Mr. Warth fails to provide the appellate court with the
requested item, the legal presumption will apply and Mr. Warth's claims will not be
addressed on their actual merits. If it is state action alone, which prevents him from
access to the requested items, then such action is a violation of due process, as per
Lane, and any such presumption should no longer apply.
Additionally, the requested item is within an Idaho appellate court's scope of
review. The transcript of the combined probation violation admission and dispositional
hearing is relevant because Idaho appellate courts review all proceedings following
sentencing when determining whether the court appropriately relinquished jurisdiction.
State v. Schultz, 149 Idaho 285, 289 (Ct. App. 2010); see also State v. Hanington, 148
Idaho 26, (Ct. App. 2009) ("When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution
following a period of probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events
before and after the original judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing
when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original
sentencing and the revocation of probation.") (emphasis added).
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both
due process and equal protection to deny indigent defendants transcripts of
11

proceedings on appeal.

The decision to deny Mr. Warth's Motion to Augment will

render his appeal meaningless because it will be presumed that the missing transcript
supports the district court's order relinquishing jurisdiction.

This functions as a

procedural bar to the review of Mr. Warth's appellate sentencing claims on the merits,
and therefore, Mr. Warth should either be provided with the requested transcript or the
presumption should not be applied.

2.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Warth With
Access To The Requested Transcript, Has Denied Him Due Process
Because He Cannot Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal

In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
in the context of death penalty cases was selectively incorporated to the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. In coming to this conclusion, the United State Supreme Court reasoned
that the ability to be heard by counsel is so inextricable related to due process that the
denial of counsel is tantamount to the denial of a hearing. Powell, 287 U.S. at 64. The
Supreme Court also stated that under the facts of Powell "the necessity of counsel was
so vital and imperative that the failure to make an effective appointment of counsel was
likewise a denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment ...
[to] hold otherwise would be to ignore the fundamental postulate, already adverted to,
'that there are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of
free government which no member of the Union may disregard."' Id. at 65. (quoting
Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898).

In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the United States Supreme Court
relied on Griffin, supra, and is progeny and determined that the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants the
12

right to counsel on appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the protection of
Douglas was extended to the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal.

According to the United State Supreme Court:
In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to counsel
on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant has a right to
counsel at trial would be a futile gesture unless it comprehended the right to
effective assistance of counsel.
Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397.

The remaining issue is defining effective assistance of counsel. According to the
United States Supreme Court, appellate counsel must make a conscientious
examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made.
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), held that the constitutional requirements

of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an
active advocate on behalf of his client .... [Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he
support his client's interest's to the best of his ability." See also Banuelos v. State, 127
Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995).

In this case, the lack of access to the requested

transcript has prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination of
the case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether
there is an additional issue to raise, or whether there is a factual support either in favor
of any argument made or undercutting any argument made. Therefore, Mr. Warth has
not obtained review of the court proceedings based on the merits and was not provided
with effective assistance of counsel in that endeavor.
Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) (overruled on
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991 )), the starting point of evaluating

whether counsel renders effective assistance of counsel in a criminal action is the
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMNAL JUSTICE, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION.

13

These standards still offer insight into the role and responsibilities of appellate counsel.
Regarding appellate counsel, the standards state:
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel,
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence .... Counsel should
advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance.
Standard 4-8.3(b).

In the absence of access to the requested transcript, appellate

counsel can neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be
presented on appeal, nor consider all issues that might affect the district court's decision
to relinquish jurisdiction. Further, appellate counsel is also unable to advise Mr. Warth
on the probable role the transcript may play in the appeal.
Mr. Warth is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and
effective assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to the relevant transcript.
Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Warth his constitutional right to due
process which includes a right to the effective assistance of counsel in this appeal.
Accordingly, appellate counsel should be provided with access to the requested
transcript and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental
briefing raising issues which arise as a result of that review.

11.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction

A.

Introduction
Mr. Warth was sent on "concurrent" riders in this case and in a Bingham County

case which is unrelated to this appeal. In the Bingham County case, the district court

14

relinquished jurisdiction, and that was the basis for the district court to relinquish
jurisdiction in this matter. Mr. Warth argues the district court abused its discretion when
it based its decision to relinquish jurisdiction on the decision made by a different court in
a different matter. Additionally, Mr. Warth's rider was excellent and he received almost
no negative feedback in his Addendum to the Presentence Investigation Report
(hereinafter, ASPI). In light of that information, the district court abused its discretion

when it relinquished jurisdiction.

B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction
The decision to relinquish jurisdiction lies within the sound discretion of the trial

court. State v. Rhoades, 122 Idaho 837, 837 (Ct. App. 1992). "When an exercise of
discretion is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry. The
sequence of the inquiry is: (1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as
one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of such
discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and
(3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason." State v. Hedger,
115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989).

Mr. Warth does not contest whether the district court

appropriately perceived its ability to relinquish jurisdiction as one of discretion.
Mr. Warth argues that the district court did not exercise that discretion based on the
appropriate legal standards and that the district court failed to exercise reason when
relinquishing jurisdiction.
Mr. Warth was serving the functional equivalent of a concurrent rider in this
matter and in the unrelated case out of Bingham County. (10/12/10 Tr., p.7, L.23 - p.8,
L.3.) The district court relinquished jurisdiction in this matter because the district court
in the Bingham County case relinquished jurisdiction and Mr. Warth did not participate
15

in the therapeutic community program recommended by the district court. (R., Vol. I.,
p.123; R. Vol. II., p.266.) This justification is unreasonable because the district court did
not have the record of the Bingham County case before it, and it did not know the
specific nuances of that case, and while a district court has broad range of discretion to
relinquish jurisdiction, it cannot abdicate that decision to different court.
Additionally, the district had never had control over Mr. Warth's programming. As
stated above, the district court also based its decision to relinquish on the fact that the
Bingham County court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction would prevent Mr. Warth from
participating in the therapeutic community program recommended by the district court.
(R., Vol. I., p.123; R. Vol. II., p.266.) However, at no time did either of the district courts
control Mr. Warth's programming, as that decision is controlled by the executive branch
of the State government.

See generally Swain v. State, 122 Idaho 918, 920-921

(Ct. App. 1992).
Further, the district court did not exercise reason when relinquishing jurisdiction
in light of Mr. Warth's exceptional rider performance.

While on his rider, Mr. Warth did

not receive any formal or informal disciplinary sanctions.

(APSI, p.2.)

The only

negative feedback provided in his APSI, is contained in the C-Notes, where Mr. Warth
was warned, early in his rider, that he was "not to be talking to termers in unit 15 while
waiting to be seen."

(C-Note attached to APSI, p.2.)

Other than that one warning,

Mr. Warth's APSI contains only positive feedback regarding his rider performance.
Mr. Warth was successful in his programming.

The following summarizes his

performance in the new directions program:
Mr. Warth has demonstrated the necessary skills to facilitate his
successful return to his community. Mr. Warth was willing to participate
in group discussions, process sessions, or homework assignments.
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Mr. Warth was able to discover his criminal and addictive thinking
distortions.
(APSI, p.2.) Mr. Warth did have some "elevated risk factors," and due to those factors
he was required to participate in the Release and Reintegration class.

(APSI, p.3.)

While in that class, staff reported as follows:
Mr. Warth ... openly [and] willingly ... engaged in the group process and
discussions. Mr. Warth was able to identify [that] one of his fears of being
sober is his change in his lifestyle. Mr. Warth completed all of the required
work and his answers were very articulate and appeared to be wellthought out. It appears that Mr. Warth has been able to acknowledge
some of the relapse issues that he will face upon his return to his
community. With all of this in consideration, it does appear that he is
prepared to appropriately deal with these issues in the community.
(APSI, p.3 (quotation omitted).)4

Mr. Warth also achieved level three of the Individual

Accountability Model, which is the highest level that can be achieved. (APSI, p.4.)
In addition to his required programming, Mr. Warth performed over 180 hours of
community service.

(APSI, p.4.)

Staff was so impressed with him they wrote the

following:
Mr. Warth additionally completed over 180 hours of community service
while at NICI. Offenders are tasked with developing a plan to use their
Besides studying his
time in a productive and prosocial manner.
programs, Mr. Warth was able to volunteer and work with others on the
compound to stay busy and be an active participant in his own life. This is
important as many offenders will perform the minimum requirements and
never aspire to succeed beyond the expectation.
(APSI, p.4.) Mr. Warth also participated in the voluntary Alcoholics Anonymous and
Narcotics Anonymous program. (APSI, p.4.) Staff wrote that, "Through Mr. Warth's
consistent voluntary attendance to these groups, he reflects the initiative to strive
toward recovery from addiction." (APSI, p.4.)

4

Mr. Warth completed 116 hours of his Career Planning and Portfolio course, but could
not complete that course due to a scheduling conflict. (APSI, pp.3-4.)
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"Mr. Warth also voluntarily participated in the Vocational Safety program to obtain
his Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) General Industry standards
certification while at NICI." (APSI, p.4.)

Mr. Warth completed the course and was

certified with OSHA's 10 hour General Industry Safety and health program. (C-Note
attached to APSI, p.1.) "In addition, he passed the National Center for Construction
Education and Research Final exam, certifying him with the basic safety module for his
Core certification." (C-Note attached to APSI, p.1.) "He received an 83% on his final
exam." (C-Note attached to APSI, p.1.) "Staff reported that Mr. Warth was an active
participant in the class and performed in an excellent manner." (APSI, p.4.)
In sum, Mr. Warth's had an excellent rider.

However, this performance was

disregarded by the district court because a district court in an unrelated matter,
relinquished jurisdiction. That fact alone does not rebut all of the good work Mr. Warth
performed while on his rider.

In light of the foregoing, the district court abused its

discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction.

111.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Reduce Mr. Warth's
Sentences Sua Sponte Upon Relinquishing Jurisdiction
A.

Introduction
Mr. Warth's age, family support, employment background, cooperation with law

enforcement, and difficult childhood are mitigating factors, which support the conclusion
that his sentences are unduly harsh.
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B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Reduce Mr. Warth's
Sentences Sua Sponte Upon Relinquishing Jurisdiction
Mr. Warth asserts that, given any view of the facts his concurrent unified

sentences of four years, with eighteen months fixed, five years, with two years fixed,
and six years, with thirty months fixed, are excessive. Due to the district court's power
under !.C.R. 35 to sua sponte reduce the length of the original sentence upon
relinquishing jurisdiction, on appeal an appellant can challenge the length of the
sentence as being excessive. See State v. Schultz, 149 Idaho 285, 288-289 (Ct. App.
2010). Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively
harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence."'

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)

(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Warth does not allege that his
sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.

Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of

discretion, Mr. Warth must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was
excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria, or objectives of
criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and
the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution
for wrongdoing. Id.
As a preliminary matter, Mr. Warth incorporates the arguments made in section
ll(B), supra, herein by reference thereto.
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Mr. Warth's family support is a mitigating factor.

See State v. Shideler, 103

Idaho 593, 594 (1982). Mr. Warth was allowed to live with his mother's home and at his
father's home. (03/19/07 Tr., p.6, Ls.21-24, p.24, Ls.1-4.) Mr. Warth also has support
from both his paternal and maternal grandparents. (PSI, p.6.)
Additionally, Mr. Warth has a positive employment background, which is a
mitigating factor. State v. Hagedorn, 129 Idaho 155, 161 (Ct. App. 1996).

At the time

of the change of plea hearing, Mr. Warth was employed at Thrifty Car Sales. (03/19/07
Tr., p.22, Ls.14-15.) According to his trial counsel:
Shayne has shown that he is employable. During the times he was
incarcerated, as soon as he would get out of his incarceration, he was
able to find employment rather quickly. His employers seemed to like him.
He's a good worker, so he's shown he can be a valuable member of our
local society by remaining employed ....
(05/14/07 Tr., p.40, Ls.3-9.) Mr. Warth was working for Smith Roofing at the time of his
sentencing hearing. (05/14/07 Tr., p.45, Ls.22-24.)
Additionally, Mr. Warth's age is a mitigating factor.
Idaho 349, 356 (Ct. App. 2009).

See State v. Cobell, 148

At the time of his original sentencing hearing,

Mr. Warth was only eighteen years old. {05/14/07 Tr., p.29, L.25 - p.30, L.2.) Mr. Warth
was only twenty two years old when the district court relinquished jurisdiction.
Further, Mr. Warth turned himself in and cooperated with law enforcement.
(06/29/11 Tr., p.16, Ls.14-24.)

Failure to cooperate with law enforcement can be

considered as an aggravating factor. State v. Ybarra, 122 Idaho 11, 16 (Ct. App. 1992).
Since a refusal to cooperate can be an aggravating factor, the presence of cooperation
should be considered a mitigating factor. According to the State, Mr. Warth cooperated
with law enforcement with "different investigations." (05/14/07 Tr., p.33, Ls.7-10.)
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Finally, Mr. Warth has been exposed to a difficult childhood. In State v. Williams,
135 Idaho 618, 620 (Ct. App. 2001), this Court noted that an abusive childhood "is a
factor that bears consideration at sentencing." Here, Mr. Warth wrote that "When I was
a child my dad beat my mom and they got divorced it was hard on me I was about 6
when it happened."

(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.6.)

However, his father his since quit his abusive behavior, remarried, and Mr. Warth loves
his step mother. (PSI, p.6.)
In sum, Mr. Warth's sentences are excessively harsh when viewed in light of the
mitigating factors.

CONCLUSION

Appellate counsel respectfully requests access to the requested transcript and
the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which
arise as a result of that review.

In the event this request is denied, Mr. Warth

respectfully requests that this Court remand this matter with instructions for the district
court to place Mr. Warth on probation. Alternatively, Mr. Warth respectfully requests
that this Court reduce the indeterminate portions of his sentences.
DATED this 29 th day of February, 2012.

/L-

v---

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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